Tuesday, May 24, 2011

The Case against Institutions

Institutional improvement is the wrong approach, says Stratfor:
Certainly, the Mexican government has aggressively pursued police reform for many years now, with very little success. Indeed, it was the lack of a trustworthy law enforcement apparatus that led the Calderon government to turn to the military to counter the power of the Mexican cartels. This lack of reliable law enforcement has also led Calderon to aggressively pursue police reform. This reform effort has included unifying the federal police agencies and consolidating municipal police departments (which have arguably been the most corrupt institutions in Mexico) into unified state police commands, under which officers are subjected to better screening, oversight and accountability. Already, however, there have been numerous instances of these “new and improved” federal- and state-level police officers being arrested for corruption.

This illustrates the fact that Mexico’s ills go far deeper than just corrupt institutions. Because of this, revamping the institutions will not result in any meaningful change, and the revamped institutions will soon be corrupted like the ones they replaced. This fact should have been readily apparent; the institutional approach has been tried in the region before and has failed.

Perhaps the best example of this failure was the “untouchable and incorruptible” Department of Anti-Narcotics Operations, known by its Spanish acronym DOAN, which was created in Guatemala in the mid-1990s. The DOAN was almost purely a creation of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The concept behind the creation of the DOAN was that corruption existed within the Guatemalan police institutions because the police were undertrained, underpaid and underequipped. It was believed that if police recruits were carefully screened, properly trained, well paid and adequately equipped, they would not be susceptible to the corruption that plagued the other police institutions in the country. So the U.S. government hand-picked the recruits, thoroughly trained them, paid them generously and provided them with brand-new uniforms and equipment. However, the result was not what the U.S. government expected. By 2002, the “untouchable” DOAN had to be disbanded because it had essentially become a drug trafficking organization itself and was involved in torturing and killing competitors and stealing their shipments of narcotics.

The example of the Guatemalan DOAN (and of more recent Mexican police reform efforts) demonstrates that even a competent, well-paid and well-equipped police institution cannot stand alone within a culture that is not prepared to support it and keep it clean.

I agree with a lot of this, but I think the author's basic conclusion from it is wrong. He says DOAN and Mexico's problems show that institution-building is a fool's errand, but the lesson from DOAN is that building effective institutions is extremely hard, that we should expect setbacks, and that the US cannot build a bunch of FBI replicas simply dropping a bunch of dollars from afar. To avoid trying to build more honest and competent crime-fighting agencies just because because they may not remain 100 percent clean strikes me as a cop-out.


jd said...

Amen, Gancho. What a pointless piece. I genuinely don't even understand what he's attempting to get at. The whole premise of the institutionalist argument is that it has to proceed along multiple tracks (police, prosecutors, courtrooms, prisons, just to start) and that it will be slow. Nobody actually thinks a quick fix for the police is enough. What a lame straw man. Also, what state-municipal consolidation is he talking about? Mando unico is still a proposal as far as I know. That's a pretty basic point.

pc said...

Yeah it was really weird. I don't understand what the flip side is to his argument. Dont focus on the institutions, instead focus on...what exactly? And also he forgets that effective institutions can also help improve the broader culture.

RE the mando unico, yeah, the only examples of it I know of are limited consolidations of different municipalities comprising the metro areas in la Laguna and Monterrey. Nothing like what he is implying though.

jd said...

Typical Stratfor - 1) use authoritative tone to cover up for shoddy analysis based on things you think you might've read in the papers one time 2) add contrarian twist 3) sell to...??? 4) profit!

Although sadly, I suspect they're raking it in off those ???s, not that I've ever met one of 'em.

pc said...

The authoritative tone is something else, isnt it? There's always a split second where I'm like, Wow that guy really sounds like he knows what he's talking about, and I hesitate to question the conclusions. Then...Wait, what??