The implicit theory of political change here, that pivotal members of congress undermine reform proposals because of “the White House’s refusal to push for real reform” is just wrong. That’s not how things work. The fact of the matter is that Matt Taibbi is more liberal than I am, and I am more liberal than Larry Summers is, but Larry Summers is more liberal than Ben Nelson is. Replacing Summers with me, or with Taibbi, doesn’t change the fact that the only bills that pass the Senate are the bills that Ben Nelson votes for.Applying this logic further south, Calderón may be the one who will be remembered as the president whose reforms didn't go far enough to make much of an impact, but as a practical matter of identifying the root of the problem right now, it's not simply because Calderón didn't push hard enough, as Leo Zuckermann has argued. It's because he doesn't enjoy a legislative majority, and the PRI wasn't interested in a thorough energy reform, or a deep fiscal reform, or what have you.
Of course, that's not universally true; on some reform issues, the blame starts with the PAN.
3 comments:
I largely agree, but the trouble is figuring out where the line is. Institutional problems aside, there are quite plausible arguments that Obama could have been more active and effective on health care, the stimulus, financial reform, etc. Likewise, Calderon has not been a model of vigor on lots of important issues; on the one where he has most actively defended his administration - security - the record shows that the actual strategy is rather lacking, meaning that maybe his own shortcomings are a relevant factor. The institutional situation in presidential systems is often definitive, but fatalism does not absolve the politicians who face obstruction of real scrutiny about their tactics/strategy.
Fair point. You can imagine an alternative universe in which Obama didn't react too strongly to the Clinton mistake of co-opting the writing of health-care legislation, and where he set the initial stimulus goal higher, so that the inevitable and arbitrary limit set by the centrists would also be higher. In such a world, the legislation would have probably been friendlier to liberals.
I think Calderon would have had a harder time, what with the absence of anything close to a congressional majority, but had he invested a little more time into explaining and defending a comprehensive tax plan when his popularity was high, rather than just tossing the 2 percent consumption tax out there without much preparation, who knows how that would have turned out.
A rebuttal and the response are both worth reading if you havent already:
http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/archives/2009/12/the-road-not-taken-2.php
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