Options

Leo Zuckermann says that Calderón has a pair of options in navigating the ascendent-PRI political landscape:

The first is openly confronting the PRI. Putting their backs against the wall. Sending to congress five initiatives on the vital reforms: labor, fiscal, energy, political, and telecommunications. Telling Congress: "Señores, these are the reforms that the President of Mexico wants. Let's debate them and vote on them." This would demonstrate leadership.

I iimagne that the PRI wouldn't like to have presidential power heaped on top of them. Above all if you take into account that, in a presidential regime, when the president and congress confront each other, public opinion tends to support the former. Especially when the approval rates of Calderón are double those of the deputies and senators. 

This strategy would imply an active executive, willing to fight for what he considers should be the reforms that the country needs in the present economic crisis. And, of course, supported by a cabinet of officials ready to go to battle. Secretaries with the capacity to debate and challenge the postures of Beatriz Paredes, Manlio Fabio Beltrones, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador. 

Would the president achieve anything with this strategy? It would depend a lot on the reaction of the priístas who are not accustomed to attacks. But the confrontation certainly would unleash a national debate that would allow us to see what is the identity of the PAN after its defeat and what the PRI wants to do with its power, beyond winning more popular elected positions and sending more money to the states. 

I agree with the last paragraph particularly, but I think the it's important to note that Calderón's posture is being and will likely continue to be dictated by events. How combative he is depends in large part on how receptive the PRI appears to be with regard to his proposals, and I don't think we have an answer to that question yet. If the PRI puts on a pretty, accommodating face, Calderón won't be able to get away with an openly hostile stance (nor will he need one). Furthermore, I think Germán Martínez's failure is important to take into account. Calderón already had a guy in a prominent position who was very sharp-tongued and not a bumbler, but he flopped miserably. That makes it harder for him to pack his cabinet with people who see politics as a blood sport. 

In any event, Zuckermann says we should look at the cabinet for clues. If PRI-friendly figures like Carstens and Medina-Mora take off or adopt lower profiles, that could be a sign that the last three years will be marked by less cooperation.